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This paper describes the design and implementation of a secure message broadcast system (SMBS). It is a secure, multi-
party chat program that ensures privacy in communication and does not rely on shared secret keys. The system was built
as a study of the feasibility of building effective communication tools using zero knowledge proofs.
There is a general consensus in the computer security comunity thallfaditional password based authentication mech-
anisms are insuficient in loday's globally connected environment. Mechanisms such as one-time-passwords are a partial
solution to the problem. The issue that these protocols don't address is the lack of mutual authentication. The Kerberos
family of systems addresses the issue of mutual authentication but relies heavily on the physical security of the server and
safekeeping of the password database.
The design of the S:MBS system addresses [he following issues:
Secure communication Message broadcasts between users will be encrypted to ensure privacy ofcommunication.
User authentication A zero-knowledge proof based on the Amos Fiat and Adi Shamir [FS86] system will be used to
authenticate users without revealing to potential eavesdroppers any information that might compromise the system.
Although much has been written about zero knowledge proofs, and 10 the best of our knowledge, few products
have actual implementations that depend on this class of authentication mechanisms, and none use them as effective
authentication techniques for widespread dynamic communication protocols [FS86, LL95, GK092, B0921-
Portable implementation The system was designed to be ponable. This was achieved by using the PERL programming
language [WS92] wherever possible.
There are three components to the system:
I. An Authentication Server verifies the identity ofall parties in the system. Authentication is the process of validating
that an entity actually is who it claims to be. An entity is not only a user, but other components of the 5MBS system.
'COnlact pen;OIl forqUe5liolls concerning thc paper,
2. A Chat Server accepts messages from all clients and distributes them to all the other participating clients. It is the
central message distribution point, and will encrypt all messages to guarantee privacy.
3. A Client is a user who wishes to participate in a message exchange with other authenticated users. A user interacts
with a client by typing messages to be displayed on other user's screens, and by reading messages typed by other
participating users. The c1iem program authenticates iLseifto the authentication server before the user is allowed to
join the system.
We will present detailed state-machines for the behaviour of each of the components of the system later in this
document, but the steps involved can be summarized below:
I. The chat server ancl the authentication server uuthemicate each other using a zero-knowledge proof [GMW86].
2. Users authenticate themselves to the authenLication server and obtain from it a session key. The session key is used
to encrypt some of the traffic to and from the user. Immediately after this key has been obtained, users obtain from
the chat server a broadcast key that will be used to decrypt broadcast messages.
3. The chat server listens on u well known port for connections. Connections will come from either users or the
authentication server.
4. The chat server learns about new users when the authentication server notifies it of valid users. The chat server adds
the new user to an internal database of registered users, and remembers the user's session key.
5. When a user connects, the chat server verifies that the incoming message has been encrypted using the correct
session key for that user.
6. The chat server broadcasts the message to all registered users, encrypting it with a global broadcast key. It is
encrypted with one broadcast key, rather than each individual user's key, to speed up distributing a message.
7. Any anomaly in the communication between the chat server and the client results in the revocation of the session
key for the client, the generation of a new broadcast key by the chat server and the redistribution of the key to the
remaining clients. This could occur if the client does not acknowledge the receipt of a message. The chat server
will assume that the client has died, and wiII remove that client from its database of registered users. The client will
have to re-authenticate itself with the authentication server.
8. The authentication server continues to accept connections from new clients and authenticate them.
Figure I illustrates the three components in the system.
2 Detailed Specifications
The clients and servers in our design conform to the following specifications:
2.1 IPC Specifications
The authentication server, chat server, and clients communicate using the TCPIIP protocol. The servers operate on well
known hosts and well known ports, and it is assumed that clients will know these in advanced.
Clients and servers can communicate with each other using messages. Messages are divided into a control portion and
a data portion, and these can be encrypted if necessary. Figure 2 shows the structure of a message.
The message identification field (MID) specifies the originator of the message. Its length is variable, limited to 255
characters, and is specified as the first byte of the string. The only predefined values of this field are the strings l "authserv"
and "chatserv", identifying those messages that originate at the authentication and chat servers.
The conlrol opeode field (COP) is a one byte field that indicates the type of message. The control data field (COD)
is any additional data that may be needed while specifying the type of message. The values defined for these fields are
shown in Table 1.
JThe length. for thcsc ~lrings is nOl shown for readability, Th~ impJemerumion would haw 10 use lhe slring~ "\Ox08aulhserv" and "\Ox07chalserv"
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Figure 1: Conceptual Organiznlion of the System. This diagram
illustrates the types of information that can be exchanged between















Figure 2: 5MBS Message Structurc. Eneh message passed between
the componcrns of Ihe 5MBS system is structured as shown in this
figure.
I Control Data Needed
ACK 0 Plain text positive acknowledgment. None
NACK 1 Plain text negative acknowledgment. None
EACK 2 Encrypted positive acknowledgment. Encrypted magic cookie
ENACK 3 Encrypted negative acknowledgment. Encrypted magic cookie
ECHAT 4 Used by clients for submitting
a message to the chat server. Encrypted magic cookie
EBCAST 5 Used by the chat server to label a
message that is being broadcast by
the server. Encrypted magic cookie
CHKEY 6 Used by the chat server to inform
clients that a new session key is being
distributed. Encrypted magic cookie
NEWUSR 7 Used by the authentication server to
inform the chat server that a new user
has just authenticated itself. Encrypted magic cookie
DELUSR 8 Used by the authentication server to
inform the chat server that a user has
been revocated all authorizations. Encrypted magic cookie
DATA 9 Plain data. Used to communicate arbitrary
data. None
I OPCODE IValue IDescription
Table 1: Defined values for the COD and COP fields in 5MBS messages
I OPCODE IDescription
ECHAT The message submitted by the client. This message should be
encrypted with the client's session key.
EBCAST The message being broadcast by the server. This message
should be encrypted with the chat server's key.
CHKEY The new message decryption key being issued by the chat
server. This message should be encrypted with the client's session key.
NEWUSR The identification (MID) and session key for the new user.
This message should be encrypted with the chat server - authentication
server private session key.
DELUSR The identification (MID). This message should be encrypted with the
chat server - authentication server private session key.
DATA Arbitrary data.
Table 2: Description of what type of messages are cnrried in the payload of an 5MBS message
The encrypted magic cookie is a string with the text "magic cookie ok", encrypted with the user key. The length of
the encrypted magic cookie is indicated by prepending to it a four byte long length field (in network byte order)
The data length field (DAL) is four bytes long (in network byte order) and indicates the length of the payload (DAT
field). The messages that carry data in the paylood are shown in Table 2.
2.2 Client
On startup, the client must obtain from the authentication server a session key Ski that will be used to encrypt outgoing
communication with the chat server. The clicnt doe.." this by connecting to the authentication server's well known host
and port, proving its identity using a zero knowledge proof, and obtaining the session key using the Diffie-Hellman key
exchange protocol. Immediately after obtaining a session key from the authentication server, and before doing anything
else, lhe clienl must wail for the chat server to send a key DJ; that must be used to decrypt all incoming broadcast messages.
Once these two keys have been obtainerl, the client can send and receive messages. To broadcasl a message lhe client
must connect to the chat server's well known host and port and transmil a message encrypled with the SJ;i key. To receive
a message, the client accepts a connection from the server and receive.... a message encrypted wilh the D k key.
Periodically, the client will send to the chat server a keep-alive message that will contain a zero-lenglh message2.
To see why the keep-alive message is necessary, consider the case where the client successfully obtains the keys
described above and listens without ever transmilling infonnation (i.e. the client is passive). Assume also that the
communication link between the chat server and the client is lost shortly thereafter, and for a period long enough for the
chat server to lry 10 send it some message. The chat server will assume lhatlheclient has gone away and delete it from its
database of active clients. Now assume that the communication link is restored shortly after the client has been deleted.
If the keep-alive message is not sent then the client would never discover that it has been deleted from the database3.
Figure 3 shows the client's stale diagram, and the following pseudo code gives a general idea of the internal structure
of the actual implementation.
• Initialize client
• Authentication with Server
• Perfonn the Zero knowledge proof and authenticate client
• Negotiate a session key Ski
• Wait for decrypling key from chat server
• Save the conlents of lhe payload as the D k key.
• Wait for connections from the network, time-outs or data from the keyboard. Loop forever
• Ifwe have data from the keyboard
• Read data from the keyboard into a buffer
• Construct a new message.
• Encrypt the message using Sh
• Send message
• Read response from the server. If we can't read or read EOF then assume that a NACK
• If wc have data from the network
• Read and verify message
• Decrypt message with Dk key. Verify that magic cookies match.
• If everything ok, send ACK (encrypt with key Ski')
• If we time-out
• Pcrform the exact steps as sending a message but wilh an empty message.
2.3 Chat Server
The Chat server accepts incoming c1ienl connections and broadcasts dala 10 clients for display. Each client communicates
with the server by encrypling ils dala with a se."sion key. This key is obtained by the client from the AUlhenlication server
al startup.
The chat server mainlains a database of clients which have connected. This database contains lhe client's ill and
session key DJ; and IP address/pOri. It is assumed thatlhis database is secure (i.e. no entries can be inserted by any other
process other than the chat server).
2Nole thot 0 1..ero lenglh messoge will conloin ~ome dOlO in lhe poylood ~cclion (OAL ond OAT fields) bccousc lhe rnessoge must be concolenoletllO
lhe mogic cookie gcnemled for lhe COD field.
JFunclionolly.lhe messoge is 0 discover-ir-I-mn-deud message mlhcr lh:m 0 keep'alive mcssoge
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Figure 3: Client Stale Dingrnm. This dingram shows the major logical
stcps that must be perfonncd during the execution of a client.
The chat server has a current global key which is used to encrypt messages to be broadcast (Q the clients. It chooses
this key at startup, and will send the key to clients as they connect. This key can be timed out and revoked as necessary.
The following pseudocode outlines the execution of the chat server:
• Chat server starts up. It initializes everything internally. The database is cleared.
• Chat server must authenticate itself wilh Auth. Server
• Chat server waits for connections on a well known port. Loop forever
• Chat server receives a connection.
• If the MID = authserv, then it is a connection from the authentication server
• If the message type is NEWUSR, then a new user is being added to the system. In this case, add the client
to the database and send him the DI: session key.
• If the message type is DELUSR then we must delete the user in the database, generate a new ill: key and
re-distribute this key to the rest of the clients
• For each client in the database do,
• Get the client's session key 5/:i.
• Send the new D~. encrypted with Sl:i.
• If the MID = a client lD
• Check that message type is EBCHAT. If not, discard the message
• IfDAL = 0, ignore message, it is a keep-alive from a client.
• Find session key Sl:i for user. Decrypt message with session key
• Send the message to all other clients.
• Encrypt the message with the DI: key - current global broadcast key.
• For each client in the database, send mc..<;suge to client
Figure 4 shows the Chat Server State Diagram.
2.4 Authentication Server
The 5MBS authentication server is seeded through a secure method with a list of all aUlhorized client tuples. The tuples
consist of the pair (identity, large number). The authentication server's only job is to authenticate the 5MBS clients ami
chat server using a zero knowledge proof.
The authentication server, when started, waits for incoming connections on a well-known port. Once a connection is
established, the authentication server performs a zero knowledge proof with the process on the other end of the connection.
The procedure will validate the identity of the incoming process. If there is a failure either with perfonning the Zero
Knowledge Proof or with communication, the authentication server severs the connection and waits for connections again.
Once the identity has been validated, a session key is generated and exchanged using the Diffie-Hellman key exchange
prolOcol. The session key is denoted SI: for the chat server or Sl:i for a client.
If the identity is detennined to be that of the chat server, the authentication server stOfes the generated session key SI:
and uses it fOf any subsequent communication with the chat server. An ACK, encrypted with the session key 51:. is sent to
the chat server and the connection is closed. If either of these two communications fail, the authentication server is reset
to its initial state. The authentication server then waits for incoming connections again.
If the identity of the incoming connection is determined to be a client, the authentication server first verifies that a chat
server has been authenticated. Ifno chat server has been authenticated, the authentication server closes the connection and
waits for incoming connections. If there is un authenticated chal server, the authentication server constructs a message
containing the client identity and the newly generated client session key 51:i, encrypts the message with SI: and opens
a connection to the chat server. If this connection fails, the authentication server closes the connection to the client and
resets to its initial state. If the connection succeeds, it sends the encrypted message to the chal server and waits for an




























Figure 4: Chat Server Slate Diagram, This diagrnm shows the major
logical steps that must be performed during the execution of a chat
server.
server is received, it then ACKs the client and closes the connection to the client. The authentication server then waits for
incoming connections again.
A session key Ski for a client can be revoked by entering the client identification at the command line. This will cause
the authentication server to generate a key revocation message and send it to the chat server.
The following pseudocode outlines the behavior of the server:
• No valid chat server, initial state
• Wait for connection or keyboard input loop forever. If connection established:
• Perform Zero Knowledge Proof and generate session key using Diffie-Hellman
• If identity is chat server
• Storc scssion key
• Send encrypted ack message to chat server using session key
• Ifidenuty is client
• If no valid chat server - close client connection
• Construct message with client id & client session.
• Encrypt message with chat server session key
• Send message to chat server
• Send encrypted ack message to client using session key
• If keyboard input, parse thc command
• If command is revoke user
• Parse and validate user name
• Construct key revocation message
• Send to chat server
• If command is list users
• List users registered in the databasc
Figure 5 shows the Authentication Server state diagram.
3 Cryptographic Foundations
3.1 The Zero Knowledge Proof
The prover (P) will convince the verifier (V) that he knows the prime factorization of a large composite number n, but
will nOl reveal to V, or anyone eavesdropping on the conversation, any hint that would help him find the factors of n. We
can do this because if the prime factors of n are known, then for any a one can find all solutions of the congruence x 2 == a
(mod n) in polynomial time. On the Olher hand, if the prime factors ofn are not know then solving the congruence x2 == a
(mod n) is as hard as factoring n.
Say the prime factorization of n is n = pq, where p and q are primes, and assume that arithmetic (+, -, *, -:-, mod)
can be done in polynomial time with large numbers. Assume also that no one knows how to factor large numbers in
polynomial lime.
Ifn::::: pq then we can solve the congruence x 2 == a (mod n) by solving the equations:z:2 == a (mod p) (yielding
the solution pair (XI,P - Xl» and x 2 == a (mod q) (yielding the solution pair (X2,q - X2». Solving equations of the
form x 2 == a (mod p) can be done in the general case with the algorithm of Tonelli and Shanks [Coh93, pages 32-35].
However, for about three fourths of the prime numbers we can find the square root modulo p if we pick p to have special
properties as follows:



















Figure 5: Authorization Server Slate Diagram. This diagram shows
the major logical steps that must be perfonncd during the execution of
an authorization server.
p ==: 3 (mod 4) => x = a(p+ll/2 (mod p)
{
a(p+3)/S (mod p)
p ==: 5 (mod 8) => x = !(4a)(P+31/8 (mod p)
if a(p-l)/4 ==: I (mod p)
if a(p-l)/-1 ==: -1 (mod p)
To find a solution to the original congruence, the solutions XJ. P - XI, X2. and q - X2 are combined using the Chinese
Remainder Theorem[Den83, pages 47-48] four times in the following four equations:
l_ XI (mod p) t ~ XI (mod p)
l = X2 (mod q) t=q- x2 (mod q)
t = p - Xl (mod p) t=p <, (mod p)
t ==: X2 (mod q) l==:q- x 2 (mod q)
Four solUlions to the original congruence exist because n contains two prime factors, and these four solutions will
result from the application of the Chine.."e Remainder Theorem to these equations. Call these solutions x. 11 - x, y, and
11- y.
The basic idea for P convincing V that he can factor n is that V presents some squares modulo nand P replies with
their square roots using the mathematical properties described above. The difficulLy with this simple approach is that there
is a 50% chance that P will reveal to V enough information to factor n. Since V has chosen a it is reasonable to n."sume
thal V knows a solution to the square root of a modulo 11. This square root must be one of the four solutions that P wi II
compute with the above mentioned procedure. Assume then that V knows x.
If after the compUlation of the square root has been completed P sends x or 11 - x to V then V learns nothing. On the
other hand, if the root thatP sends is y or n- y then V can factor n because either gcd(x +y, n) = p or gcd(x + y, 11) = q.
The solution to this problem is to force V 10 choose an a so thaI he does not know any solutions to the congruence
x 2 ==: a (mod TI). This can be done by lettingP choose part ofa. Our algorithm requires that P and V to choose numbers
band d lhat will be multiplied together to produce a number a = bd (mod n). V will not know a root to this number
and hence will not be able to factor n when P returns a solution to the congruence x 2 == bd (mod n)4.
These are the steps thal P and V mUSl go through to perform the Zero Knowledge proof:
Algorithm from p's side:
• Assume that P knows n = pq
• Choose some random number a such that..;n < a < n
• Letb = a2 mod n
• SendbtoV
• Get d from V
• Solve x2 == bd (mod n). Let XI be one of the four possible solutions (chosen alrandom).
• Get the resull of a coin toss from V
• If the coin is head then send a to V. Else, send XI to V.
Algorithm from V's side:
• Assume that V knows n but nol P. q
• Choose some random number c such that..;n < c < TI
• Leld=c2 modn
• Get b from P
4A word ofeauliOlt. If V eillltrick P imo solving lhc congruence;102 := lid (mod n) wilh lhe samc v:llue forM man: than once lhen hc may be able
10 factor n_
• SenddtoP
• Toss a fair coin so that the probability of getting heads is equal to the probability or getting tails. Send the resull of
that fair toss to P
• Get y from V
• If lhe coin toss was head verify that!p mod n :::: b, else verify that y2 mod n :::: bd mod n.
Note that if V receives d before sending b then he could compute b :::: z2/b and cheat. Hence the verification step using
the fair coin. Every time through the protocol P has a 50% chance of cheating V. Hence, all steps of the algorithm must
be performed many times. If the results of the last step in V are always correct, after many steps V accepts that P knows
the factorization of n.
After k rounds through this protocol the probability of P successfully cheating V is (VI;. After 10 iterations, for
example, the probability of P cheating V is one chance in 1,024. After 20 iterations the chances of P cheating V is onc
in 1,048,576. After 100 iterations the chances ofP cheating is, approximately, one in 1030. The number of iterations that
must be performed then depends on the level of confidence desired.
3.2 Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
Diffie-Hellman was the first public-key algorithm invented [Sch96, pages 513-514]. II is named after its authors [DH76j.
It gets its security from the difficulty of calculating discrete logarithms in a finite field, as compared with the ease of
calculating exponentiation in the same ficld. Diffie-Hellman can be used for key distribution. Using the familiar Alice
and Bob as the participants, the algorithm is simple. First, Alice and Bob agree on two large integers, nand g, such that
I < 9 < n. These two integers do not need to be secrel and they can be decided on over some insecure channel. The
protocol goes as follows:
• Alice chooses a random large integer x and computes X :::: g= mod n
• Bob chooses a random large integer y and computes Y :::: gU mod n
• Alice sends X to Bob and Bob sends Y to Alice. Neither disclose x or y.
• Alice computes k :::: y= mod n
• Bobcomputes e:::: XU mod n
Both k and e are equal to g=u mod n and they are the shared key. No one listening on the channel can compU!e that
value since they only knOW n, g, X, and Y. Unless they can compute the discrete logarithm and recover x or y, they can
not solve the problem.
The choice of 9 and n can be important to the security of the system. The modulus n should be prime and also
(n - I )/2 should also be prime. The number 9 should be a primitive root mod n. One of the more important requirements
is that n be large, at least 512 bits.
4 Implementation Details
We have chosen to implement the 5MBS system using the Perl programming language. There are two reasons thatjustify
this choice of programming language: I) Perl is a highly portable language, and 2) Prototyping is much faster than C. In
its current incarnation (version 5), Perl supports modular programming by way of the Package COllsfrllcl. We made heavy
use of the Perl Package feature. The following packages were created:
!PC Package. The lPe package provides a consistent interface to all those routines that are necessary for the construction
and decoding of packets (or messages) that must be used for all interprocess communication. Among the routines
provided by this package are the routines builcLipc..message and decode-ipc...message. These routines
perform all the necessary encapsulation, including the creation of checksums, magic cookies, encryption of payload
data, etc. Also, the message slructure can be easily enhanced without affecting any other module in the system.
Because testing is an inlegral part of the development procC!;s we provided a comprehensive set of tests for the
routines in this module in the file test_ipc. pl. These tests not only verify that messages are constructed correctly,
but also test that the routines detecl and corrcctly rejecL invalid messages or messages that have been corrupted.
ZKP (Zero Knowledge ProoO Package. The ZKP package implements the zero knowledge proofprowcol as explained
in section 3.1. The package provides two routines that act as the verifier (zkp_server) and prover (zkp_client).
Both routines are given a file handle that is bound to the TCPIIP socket that will allow them to communicate. This
file handle must allow bi-directional flow of informalion.
The zkp_server routine requires that a reference to the client database be passed as a parameter. This databa~e
is an associative array where the indices are the names of the users defined in the keyfile file and the values are
the public keys for the clients.
The zkp_client routine requires that numbers p, q and n, which it needs to solve the congruences, be passed as
parameters.
The zkp_client and zkp_server routines also accept an optional parameter that indicates that a visual progress
feedback should be printed. The visual feedback consists ofa series ofasterixes (*) printed in the screen at periodic
intcrvals.
To tcst the zero knowledge, a test file is provided that feeds the prover and verifier incorrect information and verifies
that all errors are handled correctly. The test file will also fork off two children lhat wHII£)' to prove their identity
to each other.
Debug Package. The package allows programs to turn on and off debugging information dynamically. Each module
can define its own module identifier. and print debugging information in several levels. Level 1 is generally
reserved for printing informative mess3ges on error conditions and unusual situations thaI might be useful to system
administrators. The debugging package allows multiple programs that share packages Lo lurn on debugging for the
same package at different levels. For example, the client program might want to display debugging information
about the IPC package at level 4, but the authenlication servcr mighl wanl Lo display only those messages at level I.
MP Package. We chose to implement the bulk of the project in Perl (for portability), but unfortuantely the PERL multi-
precision libraries were too slow. We used multi-precision libraries coded in C, so an interface between the two was
needed. Perl allows C routines to be built in to extend the language, but this involves recompiling the local Perl
installation. As we were aiming for a portable and general system, this was not acceptable.
Instead. a C program was wrapped around the MP library which accepted commands and arguments from the
standard input and passed these on to the MP routines. The result from the routines were then printed to the standard
output. A Perl program could then simply open a pipe to this program and pass it the required command and
arguments, and read the result back in. Both commands and arguments were handled as strings. The C wrapper
program then converted these into MP numbcrs to pass to the.MP library.
A Perl package was written which encapsulated all the required MP routines. It provided a consistent interface to
the MP library for other Perl code to use. It in turn called a program called mpdispatch. This was a C program
which accepted commands (as strings) and arguments, and called the MP library. The result was then wrinen onto
the standard output, which was the end of a pipe from which the Perl program could read the rc....;ult. Figure 6
illustrates this process.
The mpdispatch program is written in C and accepts commands and arguments from standard input. It then
translates these into the internal MP fonnat and calls the appropriate MP library routine. The result is printed on
standard output.
This mechanism is flexible, but has the drawback that every mathemaLicai operation requires a program to be
executed. To offset this, we identified portions of code that did many mathematical operations, and wrote special
routines to perfonn these operations. The Zero Knowledge Proof needed some specialized operations (e.g. solve
congruence, perform Chinese RemainderTheorem). These were buill into the mpdispa tch program and increased
the speed with which the ZKP could operate.
Pcrl Code
--








Read resuhs 1- prints 10 Iresult to Perl from sldoU! sldout
Figure 6: Calling lhe MP library from Perl. The MP library was
written in C and we use the process outlined in this diagram to imcrface
it with 5MBS (wrillcn in Perl).
An essential part of the project was testing. As client-server systems are difficult to test, it is essential that all the
lower-level modules operate correctly in situ. A test script was developed in parallel with the MP-library interface
to test each routine.
A script was developed that tested the boundary conditions of each routine. Each test would print "Passed" or
"Failed" after the tesl. After any modifications to the MP Perl roUline..<;, the test script was run, and all tests very
verified as passing before proceeding. This script is called testmp _pI. Note however, it cannot test all possible
inputs to the routines - we discovered problems in the MP library in taking square-roots of seemingly innocuous
numbers which would never have been found with th·ls test script.
The random number generator is needed in the Zero Knowledge Proof and Diffie-Hellman key exchange packages.
Its purpose is to provide a multi-precision random number in a specified range. A requirement of this generator was
that it musl be quick, efficient and reasonably random. Random numben; are difficult to generate on computers, bur
there some well known sources of randomness in any system. We chose to use the audio device available on mOSl
Sun SPARCstations, in conjunction with the time ofday.
The randnurn() routine in PERL takes two parameters which give the upper and lower range of the random
number to be generated. These are multi-precision numbers. If they are equal (i.e. there is no range) then their
value is returned (e.g. randnurn (15,15) returns 15). If the lower range is greater than the upper range, they are
switched (e.g. randnurn (30,15) is equivalent to randnurn (15,30)).
The randnurn ( ) call is interpreted by thempdispatch (). which routine calls the generate-rand ( ) routine
in C. This attempts to open the audio device /dev/audio and read data from it. This data is hopefully random
(if the microphone is turned on), and i~ used to build a random multi-precision number. The time of day is added
to each digit to introduce extra randomness if the microphone is not enabled. The audio device must be present for
the random number generator to work. Furthermore, it must be turned on - a check is made at the ~tart of the mp.pl
package to see iflhe audio device is returning information which would indicate that the microphone is turned off.
If so, the package exits with an error.
Crypt Package. The crypt package provides an interface to the encryption/decryption program. The encryption and
decryption processes in this project are performed using the IDEA program [LM91, Lai92]. There are two routines
in the crypt package, encrypt and decrypt. Both routines take the same arguments as input: a string Sand
a key k. The string S must be non-zerO in length. Also, it must be less than 1024 characters, which is the IDEA
program buffer size. The key k is a string with non-whitespace characters used to encrypt or decrypt the string S.
The data encrypted by IDEA is nonnal1y located in files and is generally binary. not ASCII fonnat. This required
the use of encoding/decoding routine..<; to transform the binary data into some usable ASCII representation and back
again. Every instance of encrypted data is encoded and manipulated in this fonnat. Before being decrypted, this
data is decoded into the nalive fonnat.
Both the encrypt and decrypt routines return an array of information. The firSl value is the status of the operation,
which can be no error, or a failure mode described bclow. If no error occurred, lhe second value is the returned
string. The output from the encryption rouline is the encoded encrypted string 5' given by 5' = encode(E.l:(5))
where E is the IDEA program, k is the encryption key, and encode is the encoding program. The output of lhe
decryption routine is 5' given by lhe expression 51 = D.l:(decode(5)) where D is the IDEA program, k is the key,
and decode is the decoding program.
We've chosen to use the IDEA block cipher for encryption and decryption. According to Schneier [Sch96, page
319], IDEA appears to be significantly more secure than DES and the software implementations are about a~ fa.~l
as DES. IDEA operales on 64-bit plaintexl blocks using a 128 bit key. It uses both confusion and diffusion mixing
operations from different algebraic groups LO provide its securily. We are using IDEA in its default operating mode,
cipher block chaining.
We exercise several lests to test the crypt package. These test are designed to test all combinalions of valid and
invalid instances of input to the crypt package, string data and keys. These teslS are performed in a serial fashion
with the output from the test compared to lhe expectcd output yielding a pass/fail message. The testS arc designed
LO exercise all the failure modes of the crypt package. These modes arc: no error, no data, an IDEA elTor, or too
much data.
Testing the string data required tests using strings of various lengths and validity. The tesl program uses zero
length input, valid length input, ovcrlength input, and invalid data for testing. Different keys of varying lenglh
and characters are used to test the keys. For lhe process of argument testing, if both arguments are not passed, the
routines return an elTor.
Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Package. The Di ffie-Hellman [DH76] key exchange package implements the protocol as
explained in Schneier [Sch96, pages 513-514]. The package provides a client routine thal communicates to another
instance of the client routine. The two instances of the client routine are eilher the authentication server and a chat
client or the aUlhentication server and the chat server. Both side... of the key exchange execute the same routine. The
protocol goes as follows:
• A and B agree on two large integers nand 9 where I < !J < nand n is a safe prime and 9 is a primitive root
ofn
• A chooses a random large integer x and computer X = g'" mod n
• B chooses a random large integer y and computer Y = gU mod n
• A sends X to Band B sends Y to A.
• A computes k := y:r mod n.
• B computes k := XY mod n.
The integers nand 9 for our Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol implementation were derived from Maple using





Since both nand 9 can be public, they are stored in the file in plaintexl. The protocol does not rely on security by
obscurilY·
The input to the client routine is a filehandle for socket communico.lion, the identification of the server (from this key
exchange client's point of view), and the identification of the other side. The client routine performs onc side of the
key exchange from the perspective of A (also known as Alice). The client routine uses the MP library routines for
choosing a random number x between I and n and calculating X = g'" mod n. This number X is sent to the other
side while Y is received from the other side ami then the session key k :::: yr mod n is calculated. The output of the
client routine is either the exchanged session key or undefined if an error in the input or the negotialion occurred.
The process of testing the Diffie-Hellman key exchange requires thal two Tep connections arc established, one
acting as server and the mher as client. To test a valid exchange, the server and lheclient compute session keys and
then lhe client sends the computed key to the server for comparison. To test for invalid input, te.'its are performed
for invalid file handles and blank or missing idenli fication strings.
4.1 Clients and Server
The lhree programs described below constitute the 5MBS system.
4.1,1 Authentication Server
The main goals of the authentication server are to authenticale a client and distribute a negotialed session key. The
authentication server reads ils private keys p and q from a file that has been encrypted using IDEA with a pass phrase.
It also reads from a file the public keys of all the potemial participants, including broadcast message clients and the chat
server. The authenticalion server then wails listening on a well-known port for incoming conneclions.
When an incoming conneclion is made, the authentication server begins the authentication process by participating
in a mutual authentication protocol using a zero knowledge proof of identity where (he incoming client connection tries
to prove who il is by being able to solve for the prime faclors in its public key read earlier. If the client successfully
authenticates itself, then the authentication server tries (0 authenticate itself to the client using the same process. This will
ensure that both the client and the server have proof of who they are communicating with.
After a successful mUlual zero knowledge proof authenlication, the server and the client exchange session keys using
the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. If the authentication client is the chat server, Ihe session key is stored for usc
with all subsequent communications with the chat server. If lhe authentication client is a broadcast message client, the
newly generated session key is encrypted and sent to thcchat server provided a chat server has already been aU!henticated.
Once all the key exchanging and handshaking is completed, the server starts to listen for incoming client connections
again.
If al any point during the authentication process or key exchange protocol an error occurs, the connection is dropped
and the previous connection information for that panicular client is lost. Also, if the communication process to the chat
server encounters a problem, the chat server must re-authenticate itself to the authentication server and re-negoliate a
session key.
Commands to the authentication server can be typed in on standard input. Ifthe command is help, the list of available
commands will be printed. If the command is list, the list of users in the database will be printed. If the command
is qui t, the open connections arc closed and the program exits. If the command is revoke, the server asks for the
identification of a user to be deleted. If the identification is valid, the users is deleted from rhe database. A message is
sent to the chat server suggesting lhe particular client to remove from the list of aUlhenticated clients. This invalidates the
client for the rest of the session.
Authentication Server Usage
% auths.pl <options>
If no options are specified, it uses default hoslnames and defaull ports for the chat server.
To change the port and host being used for the chat server, use:
-ch <hostname> - hostname of the chat server
-cp <port> - port number for communicating with chat server
To change the pon number thar the auth server listens on, use:
-ap <port> - port number to listen for connections on
For example, to run the auth server verbosely on port 5004 and expected the chat server to be run on host yavin P0rl
5005,do
auths_pl -v -ap 5004 -ch yavin -cp 5005
4.1.2 Chat Server
The chat server was built with one simple rule - if any error occurs in communicating with a client [hen that client is
ignored from then on. Many special cases arc avoided by doing this as it simplifies the code considerably.
The chat server maintains a database of all clients il currently knows about. This is simply an array in memory
giving the session key for thal client, its machine address and port. This information is passed to the chat server by the
authentication server when a new client has successfully passed lhe authentication process.
The chat server authenticates itself with the aUlhentication server and then authenticates the aUlhentication server.
Once il has done this, il negotiates a session key with lheauthentication server. Finally, ilgeneratcs a large random number
(Ok) which will be used as a session key to encrypt outgoing broadcast messages. It then waits for connections on its well
known port. If a connection comes in from the authenticalion server, it is eilher a NEWUSR command or a DELUSR
command. ANEWUSR message lells the chat server thal a new client has successfully authenticated. The client's session
key, address and port are sent LO the chat server. It adds these to its database and then attempts to send the current Dk LO
the new client. If it fails to do this, then jt removes the client from the database.
If a client connects, it is to send a chat message LO other clients. The chat server decrypts the message using the client's
session key, and verifies the message integrity. Illhen encrypls lhe message with lhecurrent Dksession key before sending
it LO eaeh c1ienl in turn. Again, a failure to send to a client will result in the client being deleted from the database.
The chal server has options to control on which host the authentication server w·i11 be located. This allows lhe
distribution of the programs on multiple machines, and more importantly, allows the authentication server to run on a
secure machine.
The chat server also has a -test option. This performs testing on some internal routines to ensure they do correl;t
parameter validation. This is used to ensure some basic correctness. Testing the client-server aspect of the chat server is
difficult, and is done by demonstration instead.
Chat Server Usage
chats_pI <options>
If no options are specified, it "does the right thing" and starts up on default pons that should correspond to the ports
in use by the authentication server. Il assumes thol alllhe clients, and the authentication server are running on the same
machine. This can be changed by the command line options.
To change the port and host being used for the authentication server use:
-ap <port>
-ah <machine> -
port for communicating with the auth server
machine name for communicating with the auth server
E.g. if the auth. server is on narnia, port 5004 do:
chats.pl -ah narnia -ap 5004
To change the port which the chat server listens on for connections use:
-cp <port> - port to listen on for connections
For example, 10 run a chat server on pan 5006 do
chats.pl -cp 5006
Thechat server assumes that its key is stored in afile named pkeys_chatserv. This is built using the regis ter..client
program. A password is used to encrypl this file when it is buill. This password is used by the chat server to decrypt the
file to exlraclthe key and its prime factors p and q
Finally, for peace of mind, the -test option allows you to run a variety of tests on the chat server to make sure it is
behaving itself. They aren't as exhaUSlive as I'd like, bUl they're better than nothing. Be sure to run lhe testmp.pI script
to lcst the MP roulines, and the olher tesl scripts as well.
4.1.3 Client
As described earlier in lhis document, the client was built to communicale with thc chat server sending and receiving
encrypted information. Upon startup, the client authenticates itself to the authentication server and authenticates lhc
aUlhenlication server (hence preventing lhe impersonation of the server), negotiates a session key with lhe authentication
server using the Diffie-Hellman protocol. and waits for connections from the chalserver.
When connections do happen they can be only oflype EBCAST and CHKEY. In the first ca.~e, lhe message is decrypted
wilh lhe decryption kcy dislributed by the chat server and in the second case the client decrypls the message with the
session key negotiated with the authentication server.




If no options are specified, it uses defaull hosl names and defauh porls for the aUlhentication and chal servers. To
change the pan and host being used for the servers use:
-ch <host name> - host n~e of the chat server
-cp <port> - port number for communicating with chat server
-ah <host name> - host name of the auth server
-ap <port> port number for communicating with auth server
To change the pan number that the client uses:
-p <port> - port number to listen for connections on
For example, to start the client on port5616 and expect Ihcchat server to be on yavin on pan 5005 and the authentication
server lO be on narnia on porI 5005, issue the command:
client.pl -p 5616 -ah narnia -ap 5004 -ch yavin -cp 5005
4.2 Adding Authenticated Users
The process for adding users to the system is fairly straightforward. The following procedure is used:
I. The client generates Bloom primes p and q (use safepdmes in Maple) for use as the privale key.
2. The client then runs the register-c1ient.pl program. The progmm asks for a user identification string, p, and q. It
returns with the public key n. The private keys are encrypted with IDEA using a puss phrase and stored in a file.
The client should keep this pass phrase and file secure.
3. The client sends the public key to the manager of the authentication server. The uscr need not worry about this
operation being secure as the key (n) is public.
4. The authentication server manager, after verifying that the public key (n) actually belongs to the user, edits the file
"keyfile" to add [he client. The keyfile format is ID:KEY where II) is the identification string of characters used
above to generate Ihe public key and KEY is the public key n derived above.
This would be done for the authentication server, the chat server, and all clients. The authentication server and its
keyfile are required to be run on a secure machine. Furthermore, the keyfile should be kept on read-only media and edited
off-line.
4.3 Finding Bloom Primes in Maple




The seeds, seed I and seed2, should be of sufficient length (around 50 digits) of a random son ofnalure (Le. Iypc fifty
random numbers with your eyes closed). The safeprime function will return the next Bloom prime after the seed.
5 Conclusions
The goal of our project was to detcnnine the feusability of implementing a number ofcrytpographic algorithms. We chose
a secure communication system as a test vehicle. We aimed to design a protocollhat would allow secure communication,
and use this to determine how feasible it is 10 build reliable, real-world cryptographic systems.
5.1 Future Work
Currently the random number generator uses the audio device to obtain random background noise. This depends on the
availability of such an audio device - we would like to make random number generation more portable in this respect.
Prime numbers are generated using Maple. We would like to include a prime number generator to allow the system to
be installed anywhere.
The servers are not multithreaded which reduces the concurrency possible. This can easily be changed.
CurrenLly, 5MBS uses IDEA as the encryption algorithm. We will allow any algorithm to be used by providing "hooks"
that another encryption package can use. For example the "encipher this data block" and "decipher this data block" hooks
could be overloaded by another encryption package, such as DES.
The interface to the multi-precision (MP) library is too cumbersome to be practical. We wrote the MP interface in Perl
so our system could be prOlotyped quickly. A better implementation would be to use other crypto libraries [Lac] or use
the GNU multi-precision package.
The cli~nt, chat server and authentication server could be ported to Java [Mic95J. This would enhance the portability
of the system - Java is bytecode interpreted and so is platform independent. The interface to the 5MBS system would be
through a Web broswer running the Java applets. This convenient interface would make SNIBS far easier to use.
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